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Ideal DoLLs as Ideology
Jeff Engelhardt
Department of Philosophy, Dickinson College
is paper argues that many philosophical theories of meaning idealize our actual
language communities and thereby contribute to perpetuating group-based oppres-
sion. I focus on externalist theories of language that posit a division of linguistic
labor (DoLL), and I argue that the DoLLs they imagine are free of oppression and
untouched by its eects. is distorts both basic theoretical assumptions and our
ideas about which meanings are to be found in some language community. By thus
obscuring oppression and its eects, we prevent ourselves from adequately address-
ing oppression’s eects on the meanings we use to understand and communicate
about the world.
Keywords: ideal theory, division of linguistic labor, nonideal theory, hermeneutical
marginalization
1. Introduction
In Charles Mills’s “Ideal theory as ideology”, he distinguishes between ide-
alizing and nonidealizing approaches to ethical theory, and he argues that
the dominant contemporary version of the former is obfuscating and “ide-
ological, in the pejorative sense of a set of group ideas that reect, and con-
tribute to perpetuating, illicit group privilege” (Mills 2005, 166). In this pa-
per, I distinguish between idealizing and nonidealizing approaches to the
division of linguistic labor (or DoLL), and I argue that the former (i) ob-
scure the inuences of oppression on linguistic meanings and conceptual
contents and (ii) thereby reect and contribute to perpetuating group priv-
ilege. I will give reasons to think that the views of the DoLL found in the
works of Hilary Putnam, Sally Haslanger, Tyler Burge, and K. Anthony Ap-
piah take the idealizing approach. Although I cannot consider here the de-
tails of every philosophical theory ofmeaning that attributes somemeaning-
determinative role to social facts, I suggest that nearly all such theories take
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idealizing approaches to the social facts they deemmeaning-determinative,
and thus nearly all are ideological in the pejorative sense.
In section 2, I will review Mills’s argument (2.1) and outline the theories
of meaning with which I am concerned (2.2). In section 3, I will introduce
divisions of linguistic labor and argue that which meaning and extension
they determine for a term depends on systematic semantic deference (3.1),
that not all systematic semantic deference is epistemically grounded (3.2),
and that some actual systematic semantic deference is grounded in struc-
tural oppression (3.3). In section 4, I will explain how idealizing the DoLL
obscures the inuences of oppression on linguisticmeanings and conceptual
contents and contributes to perpetuating group privilege.
2. Idealization in theories of mind and language
2.1 Ideal theory as ideology
e distinction between idealizing and nonidealizing approaches to ethi-
cal theory concerns modeling a polity. In the versions relevant to us, the
models of idealizing approaches abstract away from race- and gender-based
oppression, treating them as bugs of the social system rather than features.
In another context, for instance, Mills characterizes Alvin Goldman’s social
epistemological project in away that suggests it takes an idealizing approach.
e picture of “society” he [Goldman] is working with is one that—
with perhaps a few unfortunate exceptions—is inclusive and harmo-
nious.us his account oers the equivalent in social epistemology of
the mainstream theorizing in political science that frames American
sexism and racism as “anomalies”: U.S. political culture is concep-
tualized as essentially egalitarian and inclusive, with the long actual
history of systemic gender and racial subordination being relegated
to the status of a minor “deviation” from the norm. (Mills 2007, 17)
Mills outlines six overlapping ways in which idealizing approaches tend to
treat systemic gender and racial oppression as anomalies. Idealizing ap-
proaches populate their model of society with “the abstract and undier-
entiated equal atomic individuals of classical liberalism”; they idealize the
cognitive capacities of social agents, ignoring how oppression might aect
how agents’ epistemic capacities develop; “they’re silent on oppression and
its eects”; they assume the society to have ideal social institutions “with
little or no sense of how their [the institutions’] actual workings may sys-
tematically disadvantage women, the poor, and racial minorities”; they as-
sume what Mills calls “an idealized cognitive sphere”, where dominant ide-
ologies do not mask oppression, there are no epistemic injustices, etc.; and
they assume that all agents will do their part in maintaining justice and just
institutions. (Mills 2005, 168–169)
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e models used by nonidealizing approaches correct these distortions.
Rather than abstract away from structural oppression and its eects, non-
idealizing approaches include oppression and its eects in their models of
society. Instead of treating the US social system as fundamentally inclu-
sive and harmonious (perhaps with a few unfortunate exceptions), for in-
stance, a nonidealizing approach models US society with patriarchy and
White supremacy as the norm rather than the exception. In this sense,Mills’s
model of modern European societies as fundamentally shaped by White
supremacy ine Racial Contract (1997) takes a nonidealizing approach.
It should be relatively clear how the models of idealizing approaches are
obfuscating:ey represent societies inaccurately, obscuring from view the
oppressive social relations, institutions, etc. of that society. Since ethical the-
ories draw on their models of society to determine what individuals and col-
lectives ought to do, models that obscure oppression and its consequences
yield ethical theories that oer no remedies for oppression and its conse-
quences. Indeed, idealizing approaches to ethical theory do not even con-
ceptualize oppression and its consequences as problems to be remedied.
is, then, suggests how idealizing approaches are “ideological in the
pejorative sense”, how they “contribute to perpetuating illicit group privi-
lege.” In societies structured by patriarchy and White supremacy, various
social structures privilege those read asWhite cis men: economic and polit-
ical institutions, epistemic resources, laws, social norms, etc. etc. If ethicists
asking “how ought we to live?” and “how ought we to structure our soci-
ety?” take it that all these structural injustices are absent from how we live
now, then their answers will both tell us nothing about how to end race- and
gender-based oppression and will make it seem—to the uncritical reader,
at least—as though these oppressions either do not exist or are only trivial
problems. Insofar as we use ethical theories to help us decide how to live and
structure our societies, these ethical theories will tell us that we do not need
to address patriarchy or White supremacy. Indeed, there are no such prob-
lems to be addressed. Taking this guidance, we would then ensure that the
patriarchal andWhite supremacist structures remain in place, perpetuating
illicit group privileges for White cis men. To paraphrase Mills, idealizing
approaches are “deeply antithetical to the proper goal of theoretical ethics as
an enterprise”; they guarantee that the inclusive and harmonious societies
of their models will never be achieved (Mills 2005, 170).
Ethical theorists are not the only philosophers who take idealizing ap-
proaches. Some philosophical theories of linguistic meaning or conceptual
content model social relations as well. I propose that nearly all of them take
idealizing approaches.
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With ethical theories that take idealizing approaches, the consequence
is that we fail to develop ways to address actual oppression and its conse-
quences, thereby ensuring that they continue. If there is an analogous con-
sequence to idealizing in theories of meaning or content, it shall be because
accurate representations of social relations, institutions, etc. matter, in some
way, to theories of meaning. Prima facie, it will have to be that for at least
some theories of meaning, social facts play a role in determining meanings,
so that a theory’s misrepresentation of social facts will mean that the theory
gives erroneous accounts of the meanings used in the society. In the next
subsection, I will call theories that do give a meaning-determinative role to
social facts “social theories of meaning”.
2.2 Social theories of meaning
Philosophical theories of meaning purport to tell us how meaning-bearing
entities come to bear the meanings they do. Some theories of meaning say
that social facts play a role in determining either word-meanings or con-
ceptual contents; in this paper, I will call all such theories “social theories of
meaning”. Wittgenstein, for instance, is oen credited with introducing use
theories of meaning, according to which “the meaning of a word is its use in
the language” (Wittgenstein 2009, 43). For a given word, a social fact con-
cerning the language community’s use of the word (at a time) determines
the word’s meaning. In this tradition, the theories developed byWilfrid Sel-
lars (1963, 1974) and Robert Brandom (1994) give similar but more complex
roles to social facts in the determination of word meanings.
In an overlapping tradition, social externalists claim that for at least some
terms or concepts, social facts determine the meanings of terms and/or the
contents of beliefs and other mental states. Social externalism is a form se-
mantic externalism, according to which some terms or concepts are such
that their meaning or content when uttered or entokened by a language
user or thinker is not fully determined by anything entirely “internal” to
the speaker—the content of a speaker’s belief is not determined by her brain
states, for instance. Social externalists add that for at least some terms, social
facts are among the “external” determinants of wordmeanings or conceptual
contents.
Traditionally, social theories of meaning have been developed with ide-
alizing approaches to social models. Like Goldman’s social epistemological
project, they assume free and equal agents, idealized social institutions, a
“cognitive sphere” without masking ideologies or epistemic injustice, etc. Of
course, I cannot attend to the details of every social theory of language and
show that each takes an idealizing approach—I do not have the space, even,
to attend to the details of all the views I havementioned above. Instead, I will
48 Ideal DoLLs as Ideology
focus on semantic externalist theories, the role they attribute to the division
of linguistic labor or “the DoLL”, and the idealized DoLL they assume.
3. Divisions of linguistic labor
3.1 DoLLs are constituted by systematic semantic deference
Hilary Putnam argued for semantic externalism partly as follows: (i) Put-
nam’s own conception “of a beech tree is exactly the same as [his concep-
tion] of an elm tree” (Putnam 1975, 143) and yet (ii) when he uses the words
“beech” and “elm”, they mean dierent things and refer to dierent sets of
trees. (iii) If it were something “in his head” that determines the meanings
of “beech” and “elm” when he says them, then given i, they would mean the
same thing. But since they do not mean the same thing when he says them
(according to ii), themeanings of “beech” and “elm”when Putnam says them
are not fully determined by anything internal to Putnam.
On Putnam’s original articulation of the view, it is not obvious that so-
cial facts play any role in determining the meanings of terms or the contents
of concepts. e traditional interpretation of his position is that for terms
referring to natural kinds, the meaning of the term (and the concept it ex-
presses) is determined by the kind towhich it refers.emeaning of “beech”
is determined by the natural kind beech trees, not by any social facts.
But Putnam himself appeals to the division of linguistic labor to explain
how it can be that his uses of “beech” and “elm” mean what they do. He
says his beech/elm example depends on “a fact about language,” namely, the
division of linguistic labor (Putnam 1975, 144). He elaborates: “We could
hardly use such words as “elm” and “aluminum” if no one possessed a way
of recognizing elm trees and aluminummetal, but not everyone. . .has to be
able to make the distinction” (Putnam 1975, 144). Although Putnam cannot
distinguish beeches from elms, there are others in the language community
who can. Putnam depends on these others to perform the “linguistic labor”
that makes it possible for the terms “beech” and “elm” to be used with dif-
ferent meanings. Since this labor is performed by some in the community—
botanists, presumably—and not others, the labor is divided. ose of us
who cannot make the distinctions necessary for the use of a term depend on
those who can in order to make our terms usable.
Moreover, Putnam says “the sociolinguistic state of the collective lin-
guistic body” xes the extension of terms that are subject to the division of
linguistic labor.
Whenever a term is subject to the division of linguistic labor, the “av-
erage” speaker who acquires it does not acquire anything that xes its
extension. In particular, his individual psychological state certainly
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does not x its extension; it is only the sociolinguistic state of the col-
lective linguistic body to which the speaker belongs that xes the ex-
tension. (Putnam 1975, 146)
Prima facie, xes is a determination relation, such that if x xes y, x at least
partly determines y. If God xes all the physical properties of the universe,
God determines all those properties. If the physical properties x all the
others, then the physical properties determine all the other properties. And
so on. Given that the sociolinguistic state of a collective linguistic body is
a social fact, Putnam does seem to accept, then, that social facts play some
role in determining the extensions of terms that are subject to the division
of linguistic labor.
Traditionally, we call those who perform linguistic labor for a term “ex-
perts”, so that we say: For terms subject to the division of linguistic labor,
“average” speakers depend on the linguistic labor of experts. In depending
on experts, we give them semantic deference: You and I defer to botanists
regarding the meaning and extension of “beech” and other botanical terms.
We defer to physicists regarding the meaning and extension of “quark” and
other technical terms specic to physics. We defer to chemists regarding
the meaning and extension of “nitrogen” and other technical terms specic
to chemistry. And so on. On the traditional view, experts receive semantic
deference systematically because they are epistemically best-positioned to
perform the relevant linguistic labor. ey have the expertise that enables
them to make the needed distinctions between beeches and elms, quarks
and muons, nitrogen and neon.
Note, however, that according to Putnam it is notmerely the distinction-
making abilities of experts that determines the extensions of terms subject
to the DoLL. It is a sociolinguistic state of the collective linguistic body.e
mere existence in the language community of experts who can tell beeches
from elms does not suce to x the extensions of “beech” and “elm”.ere is
something more. What more? What “state of the collective linguistic body”,
is needed? Prima facie, it is systematic semantic deference to the relevant
experts. If systematic deference in the English language community did not
go to botanists but to some others who act as though “beech” and “elm” are
coextensive, then presumably our terms “beech” and “elm” would be coex-
tensive. As I have argued elsewhere, while we give systematic semantic def-
erence to botanists for the botanical term “fruit”, English also has a legal term
“fruit” for which systematic semantic deference goes to certain legal author-
ities (in a jurisdiction) and their ocial dictates—not to botanists.e legal
term is not coextensive with the botanical term, for in the US, the term’s
extension does not include the botanical fruit tomatoes, and in the EU, it
includes at least one non-fruit, carrots (Engelhardt 2018). If semantic def-
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erence for this term did go to botanists, then presumably it would be coex-
tensive with the botanical term.e existence in the English language com-
munity of botanists who can tell botanical fruits from non-fruits does not
suce to x all uses of the word form “fruit” to the botanical kind. Rather,
practices of systematically deferring to legal authorities for legal termsmake
it so that those authorities perform the linguistic labor for the legal term
“fruit”, and dierent practices of systematically deferring to botanists make
it so that botanists take on the linguistic labor for the botanical term.
I take three points from these considerations. (1) If a term is subject
to the DoLL, then there is a social fact that partly determines its meaning
and/or extension. (2) at social fact is that there is systematic semantic
deference for the term from average speakers to some group. (3)at group’s
practices then determine the term’s meaning and extension for the language
community.
In light of 1, I will focus on all those views that accept that there is a
DoLL.is includes many views that are externalist but whose supporters
would deny that they are social externalists. Perhaps most saliently in this
context, it includes Kwame Anthony Appiah’s appeal to a DoLL in his 1996
account of the concept RACE and Sally Haslanger’s externalist accounts of
gender and race terms. (e.g., Haslanger 2012)
3.2 Idealized DoLLs
Points 1 and 2 above together suggest that DoLLs may be grounded on epis-
temic dierences among community members or not. at is, a language
community might give systematic semantic deference for a term to those
who are in fact epistemically best-positioned to identify the term’s exten-
sion, but they need not. Social structures in a language community might
instead make it so that systematic semantic deference goes to those in the
highest caste, to a privileged race or gender, or to a revered religious order.
To put it another way: the social fact in some community with a DoLL for a
term might be epistemically grounded, but it need not be. Nonetheless, the
most prominent accounts of the DoLL assume that semantic deference is al-
ways grounded in epistemic positions, with those who are better positioned
getting deference from those in worse epistemic positions.
In this subsection, I will briey make the case that social theories of
meaning that posit a DoLL idealize it (i.e. the DoLL) by assuming that sys-
tematic semantic deference is always epistemically grounded. en, I will
argue that this assumption is false. In the next subsection, I will make the
case that systematic semantic deference in communities shaped by patri-
archy and White supremacy systematically give semantic deference to the
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groups who are privileged by those oppressive structures, paradigmatically
White cis men.
In making the case that philosophers have traditionally idealized the
DoLL, I will focus on the assumption that systematic semantic deference
is always epistemically grounded, with deference “owing up” epistemically,
i.e. from worse epistemic positions to better. is assumption is idealiz-
ing in Mills’s sense because it obscures the actuality that, for instance, race-
and gender-based hierarchical social positioning grounds some systematic
semantic deference, with deference owing up the hierarchy (rather than
epistemically), i.e. from subordinate to dominant social positions.
In Putnam’s case, the assumption is not expressed explicitly; it is evident
in the examples given and not given. In all of Putnam’s examples, those who
know less about the kind to which a term refers systematically give semantic
deference to those who know more about it. ose of us who cannot dis-
tinguish beeches and elms give semantic deference for “beech” and “elm” to
the botanists who know more about them. ose who cannot distinguish
real gold from fake give semantic deference to those who can (Putnam 1975,
144–145). And so on. e semantic deference in all of Putnam’s cases oc-
curs in virtue of epistemic dierences among speakers, where the epistemic
superiority of some language users relative to others explains and grounds
semantic deference from the latter to the former.
In some of Sally Haslanger’s work on race and gender terms, she en-
dorses semantic externalism for such terms and outlines a division of lin-
guistic labor. On Haslanger’s view, terms that are subject to the DoLL have
their extensions determined in two steps: rst, “by ostension of paradigms
(or other means of reference-xing)”, and then by “implicit extension to
things of the same type as the paradigms” (Haslanger 2012, 398).e work of
linguistic labor is then amatter of identifying “the (an?) objective type, if any,
into which the paradigms of a particular concept fall” (Haslanger 2012, 398).
Identifying objective types into which paradigms of a concept or term fall is
empirical research into whatever objective types exist in our world, so that,
prima facie, the linguistic labor of identifying objective types is performedby
expert researchers like botanists for “beech” and “elm”, chemists for “water”,
medical experts for “arthritis”, social scientists for “underclass” (Haslanger
2012, 134), and so on. “It is up to the ‘experts’,” Haslanger says, “to determine
what kind the paradigms share” (Haslanger 2012, 134). Why would it be ex-
perts who perform the linguistic labor in Haslanger’s DoLL? Presumably,
it is because experts on a term’s extension are epistemically best-positioned
to identify that extension, and semantic deference is systematically given to
those who are epistemically best-positioned in Haslanger’s DoLL: system-
atic semantic deference is epistemically grounded, owing up from worse
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epistemic positions to better. Indeed, Haslanger notes that this is the case
no matter whether individual speakers intend to defer to experts or not.
Semantic externalismdoes not depend onmy intention to defer. Even
if I think I know perfectly well what arthritis is, when I believe I have
arthritis inmy thigh, the content ofmy belief is determined by experts
on joint disorders (Burge 1979). (Haslanger 2012, 134)
I do not deny that individual language users may give semantic deference
without intending to (or at least without being aware of any intention to); I
oer this quotation rather as evidence that on Haslanger’s view of the DoLL,
semantic deference is not grounded in individual intentions but in some-
thing else, and given that deference always seems to go to relevant experts,
the “something else” is presumably the experts’ epistemic superiority. Se-
mantic deference is epistemically grounded in Haslanger’s DoLL.
Tyler Burge seldom uses the phrase “division of linguistic labor”, but his
social externalism employs one to account for the determination of mean-
ings and extensions in a language community. In “Intellectual norms and
the foundations of mind,” he says, “We may imagine a vast, ragged network
of interdependence, established by patterns of deference which lead back to
people who would elicit the assent of others” regarding the meaning and ex-
tension of some term (Burge 2007, 258-259). Who elicits the assent of others,
and how do they do it? Burge says it is “the most competent” speakers, and
“to put it crudely, a person counts as among the most competent if he or
she would be persuasive to other competent speakers in the use and expli-
cation of the language” (Burge 2007, 259).ose who systematically receive
semantic deference are the most competent. Presumably, that is just to say
that semantic deference systematically goes to those who are epistemically
best-positioned, and semantic deference is epistemically grounded.
But to say that one earns semantic deference thanks to their abilities in
“persuasion” makes it seem as though the abilities of the most competent
speakers need not be epistemic abilities or abilities with epistemic resources
or perhaps even abilities at all. Perhaps it is possible to say that a speaker is
regarded as most competent in some oppressive system thanks to his social
position in that system. If Burge acknowledges that a speaker might receive
systematic semantic deference because, say, as a wealthy White man in a
patriarchal white supremacist capitalist system, there are norms that make
other speakers inclined to nd him persuasive, then Burge’s view might not
idealize semantic deference.
Burge makes it clear, however, that semantic deference grounded in ra-
tional persuasion is, in his view, the norm.
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. . . the most competent speakers are pre-eminent not merely because
they impress the impressionable.eir inuence is based on persua-
sion that is subject to dispute and cognitive checks. (Burge 2007, 260)
He considers deviations from the norm, but they involve “the attractiveness
of the style of speech, the power or status of the speaker, or the impression-
ability of the hearer” (Burge 2007, 260). He does not consider the eects that
systematic oppression might have on semantic deference.
On Burge’s view, then, those who receive semantic deference do so be-
cause they are “persuasive on matters about which there are objective rights
and wrongs and on which substantive reasons have a bearing” (Burge 2007,
260). To put it another way: the most competent speakers are the epistemi-
cally superior speakers, and they receive systematic semantic deference be-
cause semantic deference is epistemically grounded.
Kwame Anthony Appiah appeals to a division of linguistic labor in his
work on “the race concept” in “Race, Culture, Identity: MisunderstoodCon-
nections” (Appiah 1996, 41–42). On Appiah’s view, “throughout the nine-
teenth century the term “race” came increasingly to be regarded. . . as a sci-
entic term,” (Appiah 1996, 41) with the result that it fell under the division
of linguistic labor and ordinary speakers gave systematic semantic deference
for the term to “the experts: the medical doctors and anatomists, and later,
the anthropologists and philologists and physiologists. . . ” (Appiah 1996, 42).
A practice of semantic deference developed for the term “race” because it
came to be regarded as a scientic term and there developed practices of se-
mantic deference to experts for scientic terms generally. Appiah notes that
this practice of deferring to scientic experts was preceded by other, non-
scientic practices of semantic deference: “older specialties, like theology
or law, had for a long time underwritten concepts—the Trinity, landlord—
whose precise denition ordinary people did not know” (Appiah 1996, 41).
Appiah’s remarks on the DoLL are brief, but his reasoning and exam-
ples are suggestive. What distinguishes those who give semantic deference
from those who get it on Appiah’s view is that the latter know the precise
denitions of the relevant terms and the former do not. “Ordinary speak-
ers, when queried about whether their term “race” really referred to any-
thing, would have urged you to go to the experts” (Appiah 1996, 41–2). Be-
cause the experts “developed the scientic idea of race,” and thus they know
what ordinary speakers do not, namely, the term’s precise denition (Appiah
1996, 42). ey are epistemically better-positioned than ordinary speakers.
Similarly, ordinary speakers defer to the epistemically-superior lawyers for
“landlord” and to theologians for “the Trinity.” Deference ows from epis-
temically worse positions to better, and it does so because systematic se-
mantic deference is epistemically grounded: the knowledge possessed by the
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experts justies their receiving semantic deference. Although Appiah con-
cludes that the experts who developed the race concept were mistaken—the
only race in the US, he says, is the human race (Appiah 1996, 32)—it is still
their relatively superior epistemic positioning that grounds their receiving
systematic semantic deference. And although Appiah is concerned to limn a
history of racism surrounding the concept of race, he does not consider how
a history of White supremacy (and patriarchy) might have shaped practices
of semantic deference.
But the actual practices of semantic deference that partly determine
meanings and extensions in English are not all epistemically grounded, and
some are plausibly grounded in oppressive structures. I will argue briey for
the rst claim here, and I will defend the second in the next subsection.
As noted above, I have argued elsewhere that for at least some legal
terms, systematic semantic deference goes to legal authorities (Engelhardt
2018). We can justify this claim in a traditional way by giving examples that
parallel Putnam’s “beech” and “elm” examples: I cannot distinguish between
libel and slander, and yet when I say “libel”, I refer to libel and not to slander.
How?ere are others in my language community who can distinguish the
two, and they receive systematic semantic deference for the terms.
But with legal terms, it is also relatively easy to point to particular perfor-
mances of linguistic labor and to the systems that enforce systematic defer-
ence to those particular performances.e US legal term “fruit” again pro-
vides a simple example. e term is used for tax purposes, dictating which
imports should be taxed as fruits and which should not be. In 1893, the US
Supreme Court decided that although tomatoes are botanical fruits, they are
legally vegetables and thus should not be taxed as fruits (Nix v. Hedden 149,
U.S. 304 (1893)).e Court Decision constituted linguistic labor for the legal
term “fruit”, dictating that its extension does not include tomatoes (cf. En-
gelhardt 2018, 1859–1860). Since the Supreme Court Justices performed this
linguistic labor and others in the community did not, the linguistic labor for
the term is divided.e term is subject to the DoLL.
Moreover, since the termhas legal signicance, there are systems in place
to enforce the Court’s linguistic labor, thereby enforcing systematic seman-
tic deference to the Court. Any who refuse to have their tomatoes taxed as
vegetables face legal repercussion; tax assessors who ocially treat tomatoes
as legal fruits rather than vegetables may face legal or professional conse-
quences; and so on. Semantic deference to the Court Decision is assured
by various parts of the overall structure of the US legal system. is shows
that at least some legal terms are subject to the DoLL, and for at least some
of these, systematic semantic deference goes to legal authorities like the US
Supreme Court.
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More to the point for present purposes, it also establishes that systematic
semantic deference is not always epistemically grounded. In the case of le-
gal terms, it is grounded in institutional structures and procedures that give
certain legal authorities the power to decide the extensions of legal terms
and that give (typically) others the power to enforce these decisions. Let
me be clear: (a) Supreme Court Justices do not receive systematic semantic
deference because of their superior epistemic positions but because of their
institutional positions, and (b) their Decisions do not receive systematic se-
mantic defense because of their rational persuasiveness but because of the
institutional authority of the US Supreme Court.
In support of a: Suppose that at the time of the 1893 Decision, there were
many legal experts whose understanding of the facts, traditions, and the-
ories relevant to the case far surpassed that had by any of the sitting Jus-
tices, and suppose that a few dozen of these had argued publicly that toma-
toes should be included in the extension of the legal term “fruit”. Suppose
that these experts were far and away epistemically best-positioned among
all people living to decide whether tomatoes should or should not be le-
gal fruits. Would their epistemic superiority have made it so that semantic
deference for the legal term systematically went to them instead of to the
Supreme Court? Of course not. Would the systems that enforce tax law
have enforced it in conformity with what the experts argued? Of course not.
(Not without widespread rebellion, anyway.)e systematic semantic defer-
ence that gives Supreme Court Justices and other legal authorities the power
to decide the meanings and extensions of legal terms is not epistemically
grounded.
In support of b: Suppose that the public arguments given by the afore-
mentioned experts were found by nearly all to be persuasive, but the Court
Decision was swayed by bribes from lobbyists to the Justices, and the Court’s
public arguments were found by all to be unconvincing. In that case, would
systematic semantic deference for the legal term have gone to the experts
instead of to the Court? Would the systems that enforce tax law have done
so in accordance with the expert decision? Of course not. Again, systematic
deference to legal authorities is not epistemically grounded. It is grounded
in the practices, structures, and procedures of the US legal system, including
practices, structures, and procedures of enforcement.
It follows that not all systematic semantic deference is epistemically
grounded.
3.3 Nonideal systematic semantic deference
Idealizing approaches to the DoLL mistakenly assume that all semantic def-
erence is epistemically grounded; this assumption obscures theways inwhich
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oppressive structures systematically shape semantic deference. Here, I make
the case that the social hierarchies of patriarchy and White supremacy es-
tablish systematic semantic deference from socially subordinate to socially
dominant language users. My reasoning is as follows: (i) If there is a norm
throughout the language community making it appropriate, all else equal,
for speakers who are members of group G to correct speakers who are not
members ofG regarding use or explication of some termT or family of terms
τ, then systematic semantic deference for T or τ goes to the Gs; (ii) in the
English language community, there are (patriarchal andWhite supremacist)
norms making it appropriate, all else equal, for dominant language users to
correct non-dominant language users regarding use or explication of nearly
all terms. It follows that systematic semantic deference for nearly all terms
in the English language community goes to dominant language users. And,
most plausibly, this systematic deference is grounded in the oppressive hi-
erarchies of patriarchy and White supremacy. Oppression thus aects the
DoLL; to idealize it is to obscure and contribute to perpetuating these ef-
fects of oppression. I will make cases for i and ii, and then note some conse-
quences of my argument so far.
Claim i is motivated by two related ideas concerning corrections and
deference. e rst is that accepted corrections regarding a term or family
of terms are reliable indicators of semantic deference: When the physician
corrects the patient’s use of “arthritis” and the patient accepts this correc-
tion, the patient gives the physician semantic deference for the term “arthri-
tis”. In concrete situations, semantic deference should be “realized” by some
acts that language users perform or some norm that they obey. I submit
that when one speaker corrects another’s use or explication of a term and
the second speaker accepts this correction, there is a realization of semantic
deference afoot.
I take motivation for this point from the most prominent example of
semantic deference in a concrete situation in the literature, namely, that in
Burge’s tharthritis thought experiment.ere, a manwho hasmany true be-
liefs about arthritis and who can oen use the word “arthritis” competently
visits his physician and expresses one of his beliefs by saying, “I have arthritis
inmy thigh.”e physician corrects the patient, “telling him that this cannot
be so, since arthritis is specically an inammation of joints” (Burge 2007,
104–105).e patient accepts the physician’s correction: he defers to her re-
garding the meaning and extension of the term. Take this as a paradigmatic
realization of semantic deference. e patient gives the physician semantic
deference for “arthritis” when he accepts her correction about the meaning
or extension of the term.is suggests that semantic deference for “arthritis”
goes to physicians and other medical experts and comes from all others.
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But it only suggests it. We should not say that anytime one language user
accepts a linguistic correction from another, then the latter is a member of a
group that receives semantic deference for the relevant term.at is: it is not
a sucient condition for group G’s receiving semantic deference for T or τ
thatwhen somemember ofG corrects somenon-member ofG regarding use
or explication of T/τ, that correction is accepted. Language users may, for a
number of reasons, accept linguistic corrections when they should not. An
ornery patient might insist that the ailment in his thigh is called “arthritis”,
and his physician might accept this “correction” of her correction in order
just to get on with the visit. A botanist might accept correction about the
explication of “beech” from a non-expert in order to protect his pride.
And we also should not say that it is a necessary condition on a group
G’s receiving systematic semantic deference for T or τ that every time some
member of G corrects some non-member of G regarding use or explication
of T/τ, that correction is accepted. It is not a necessary condition on medi-
cal experts’ receiving systematic semantic deference for “arthritis” that every
time a physician corrects a patient’s use of “arthritis”, the patient accepts it.
Some patients will not trust physicians for various reasons; some patients
will have extreme epistemic arrogance; and so on.
is points us to the second ideamotivating claim i: it is not just accepted
corrections that are paradigm realizations of semantic deference; it is appro-
priate corrections, corrections that ought to be accepted. In the tharthritis
case, whether the patient accepts the doctor’s correction or not, he ought to.
If the patient tries to correct the physician and insist that the ailment in his
thigh is called “arthritis”, then no matter whether she accepts it or not, his
correction is inappropriate.
For these reasons, I propose to take it as a sucient (but I do not say
necessary) condition on group G’s receiving systematic semantic deference
for T or τ that there is a norm throughout the language community making
it appropriate, all else equal, for members of G to correct speakers who are
not members of G regarding use or explication of T/τ. Where such a norm
is in place and some member of G corrects a non-G’s use or explication of
T , then, ceteris paribus, the latter ought to accept the correction, no matter
whether they in fact do so; and, all else equal, Gs ought not to accept correc-
tions from non-Gs, no matter whether they do or do not. Where this norm
holds throughout the language community, then the Gs’ corrections will be
systematically appropriate: they will receive systematic semantic deference.
is is equivalent to claim i.
Let me make two notes on claim i before I turn to ii. First, a note on
ceteris paribus conditions. Even though experts on rheumatoid conditions
receive semantic deference for “arthritis” and there is plausibly a normmak-
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ing it appropriate for all others to accept their corrections regarding the use
and explication of “arthritis”, the norm holds when conditions are “normal”:
provided the expert is not intoxicated, provided the word form “arthritis”
is not being used as code for something non-medical, etc. I take that to be
relatively obvious. In addition, although I say the condition I give is a suf-
cient condition for G’s receiving semantic deference, we should take the
suciency here as subject to ceteris paribus qualications as well: provided
there is no other norm that overrides the norm in question, provided the
term(s) T/τ are at least sometimes used in the community, etc.
Second, in the familiar cases, the norms that ground systematic seman-
tic deference are epistemic norms. It is the physician’s epistemic position
relative to her patient’s that grounds the appropriateness of her correction.
But, one way to put my point in this section of the paper is that not all the
norms that ground systematic semantic deference are epistemic norms. As
I illustrated above, some of them are norms of legal systems. And as I will
now show, some of them are norms of patriarchy and/or White supremacy.
I motivate claim ii by pointing to the systematic occurrences of man-
splaining and Whitesplaining; that these phenomena occur systematically,
I claim, suggests that there are (patriarchal and White supremacist) norms
making it appropriate for men to correct non-men and Whites to correct
non-Whites. We call attention to these behaviors and label them in our ef-
forts to resist the norms that make them appropriate.
e widespread recognition of mansplaining in the English language
community is probably thanks to the examples in Rebecca Solnit’s essay,
“Men Explainings to Me.” In the rst example, Solnit is at a party de-
scribing a book she had written when an “imposing man who’d made lots
of money” interrupts her to describe a more important book on the same
topic of which he had read a summary. Of course, it turns out that the book
he describes is Solnit’s book, the book she was already summarizing, and he
did not know it because he had not read it. It is not obvious what the full
extension of the term “mansplaining” is, given its popular uses in various
media, but let me note two features important for us. First, in mansplaining,
at least one man contributes to a conversation with women or non-men as
though he is in a superior epistemic position to them when in fact he is not.
Although Solnit’s epistemic position regarding the topic of her book was su-
perior to her interlocutor’s, he nonetheless contributed to the conversation
as though his position was superior.
Second, as the name suggests, these cases are gendered.at is not to say
that all and only men mistakenly act in conversation as though they are in
superior epistemic positions, though. Why are they gendered, then? ere
are plausibly a number of good reasons; let me propose one: Under patri-
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archy, there are norms making it appropriate for men to contribute to con-
versations with women or non-men as though they, the men, are in supe-
rior epistemic positions. Various phenomena discussed in the social epis-
temology literature testify to the existence of such norms: the testimonial
injustices that discredit non-men and give men inated credibility (Fricker
2007, 17–30, Medina 2011, 56–64), the stereotypes of non-men as epistemi-
cally inferior (Fricker 2007, 30–60, Langton 2010, 459–464); the discursive
injustices that distort the speech acts of non-men (Kukla 2014); and so on.
e conversational contributions that these normsmake appropriate are
general.ey include interruptions, explanations, condescending tones, cor-
rections, andmore. Here, of course, our interest is in corrections, and specif-
ically corrections regarding the use or explication of a term. Since the norms
make such conversational contributions generally appropriate for men, they
thereby make such corrections appropriate for men. And since the norms
are general, the licenses they give to men are not limited to any particu-
lar terms. us, the norms even license non-gynecologist men to correct
women gynecologists regarding the use and explication of “vulva” and
“vagina” (Perlman 2019). us, I submit that in the English language com-
munity, there are (patriarchal) norms making it appropriate, all else equal,
for men to correct women and others read as non-men regarding the use or
explication of nearly all terms.
e term “Whitesplaining” has had a more specic popular application
than “mansplaining.” In an analysis column for CNN, for instance, John
Blake denes it this way:
. . . an aiction that’s triggered when some white people hear a person
of color complain about racism. ey will immediately explain in a
condescending tonewhy the person is wrong, “getting too emotional”
or “seeing race in everything.” (Blake 2019)
But Blake does highlight the same mistaken epistemic superiority I empha-
sized with mansplaining:
e implication [of Whitesplaining]:ese white people know more
about how racism operates than those who’ve struggled against it for
much of their lives.
To become a victim of “whitesplaining” is infuriating. Imagine a
plumber trying to tell a pilot how to land a plane or a man trying to
tell a mother what it feels like to give birth. (Blake 2019)
I suggest that while “Whitesplaining” may not apply to all cases in which
Whites contribute to conversations with non-Whites as though their epis-
temic positions are superior, the systematic occurrence of Whitesplaining
points to the same sorts of general norms.at is, under White supremacy,
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there are normsmaking such conversational contributions appropriate; and,
again, there is evidence for these norms in the form of various phenomena
discussed in the social epistemology literature: As the authors cited above
note, non-Whites also suer testimonial injustice, discrediting stereotypes,
discursive injustice. As above, the corrections that are paradigmatic exam-
ples of semantic deference are a subset of these conversational contributions.
us, I claim that underWhite supremacy, there are normsmaking it appro-
priate for Whites to correct non-Whites regarding the use or explication of
nearly all terms.
Taking the considerations from mansplaining and Whitesplaining to-
gether, we have reason to believe that there are norms making it appropriate
for dominant language users to correct non-dominant language users re-
garding use or explication of nearly all terms. We have reasons to accept
claim ii.
With claims i and ii established, we have reasons to accept that under pa-
triarchy andWhite supremacy, systematic semantic deference goes to dom-
inant language users, and not always to those who are epistemically best-
positioned to perform the relevant linguistic labor. at is, although social
theories of meaning uniformly idealize the DoLL, our actual DoLL is non-
ideal.
4. Ideal DoLLs as ideology
Where a social theory of meaning misrepresents the social facts of some so-
ciety, it will give inaccurate accounts of themeanings in that society. Whereas
Haslanger takes gender terms to be determined by social theorists in an ide-
alized DoLL, systematic semantic deference in our nonideal DoLL may in-
stead go to powerful White men with an interest in perpetuating patriarchy
(Haslanger 2012, 135). While Appiah emphasizes the important intellectual
history of the race concept, systematic semantic deference for race terms
may presently go to contemporary Whites invested in the evolving ideolo-
gies of White supremacy.
But still, one might think that this hardly matters for a philosophical
theory of meaning. Many philosophical theories of meaning aim to say how
meanings are determined generally, not to say what any particular mean-
ings are, except as example cases to demonstrate the workings of the general
theory. If a theory’s general outline of how meanings are determined partly
by social facts is right, but it gets some or all of those social facts wrong, is
not that a merely trivial problem for the theory? e theory would be true
in essential respects, but the examples used to illustrate it would simply be
mistaken.
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In fact, there are two reasons why we should be concerned about ide-
alizations in social theories of meaning. First, it is not true for all social
theories of meaning that if the theory were to acknowledge oppression and
its eects, it would remain the same “in essential respects”. As shown above,
theorists who accept the DoLL uniformly assume that systematic seman-
tic deference is epistemically grounded. It is at least arguable that this is
assumed to be an essential feature of DoLLs. But this assumption is mis-
taken, and theorists plausibly make this assumption thanks to the idealizing
approach. As I have argued, in societies shaped by patriarchy and White
supremacy, it is plausible that systematic semantic deference is grounded in
the oppressive hierarchies that grant illicit group privileges toWhite cismen.
When we idealize language communities, we fail to see this, and our theo-
ries of meaning that posit a DoLL get it wrong, even in essential respects.
ese errors obscure both oppression itself and its eects on our linguistic
meanings and conceptual contents.
Second, just as idealization in ethical theories prevents us from address-
ing oppression with our ethical theories, idealizing in social theories of
meaning prevents us from addressing the eects of oppression with our the-
ories of conceptual ethics. Conceptual ethics is partly concerned to tell us
what some society’s concepts ought to be. If we idealize the social facts of
our society and thereby obscure the eects of oppression on our meanings,
conceptual ethicists will be in the same position as idealizing ethical the-
orists. Rather than addressing oppression and its eects on our linguistic
meanings and conceptual contents, we mistakenly model our meanings and
contents as unaected by oppression. We thereby ensure that we do not ad-
dress the eects of oppression on our terms and concepts. Plausibly, this is
deeply antithetical to the proper goal of conceptual ethics as an enterprise.
5. Conclusion
I propose that all or nearly all social theories of meaning take the idealiz-
ing approach and thereby contribute to perpetuating oppression. I have not
justied this proposal; rather, I have focused primarily on one idealizing as-
pect, epistemically grounded semantic deference, of one family of theories,
namely those that accept aDoLL. Traditional accounts of theDoLL plausibly
idealize in other ways as well—science as a social institution, for instance, is
plausibly idealized in traditional natural kind externalism. I leave the explo-
ration of other idealizations of the DoLL and other idealizing social theories
of meaning for another place. I have also only scratched the surface of the
eects of nonidealizing approaches on social theories of meaning. Episte-
mologies of ignorance as in Mills’s “White Ignorance” (2007) do well to ar-
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ticulate conceptual contents distorted by oppressive social facts, but philoso-
phers of language and conceptual ethicists can do much more and ought to.
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